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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

No. 23860

Plaintiff-Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant seeks a judicial determination of his
righ~

t0 continue to operate an outdoor advertising sign.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Second District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan

presiding, dismissed Defendant-Appellant's appeal from the
decision of the Utah Transportation Commission as not being
timely.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have his appeal reinstated
in the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nine months after a hearing before Commissioner Charles
Ward of the Utah Transportation Commission on December 9, 1976,
the Commission as a whole adopted a resolution declaring DefendantSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant's signs to be in violation of the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act.

Twenty-five days after notice

~f

this

action, on October 25, 1977, Defendant-Appellant filed his
appeal in the Second District Court.

That Court granted

Plaintiff-Respondent's motion to dismiss on the grounds that
Defendant-Appellant's appeal was not timely.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR
THIS APPEAL DUE TO APPELLANT'S COMPLIANCE
WITH THE 30-DAY FROM NOTICE OF DECISION
RULE EXPRESSLY ADOPTED BY THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
Tne sole issue before this court is

whtth~r

or not a

notice of appeal filed 25 days from Appellant's receipt of the
decision of the Utah Transportation Commission complies with
the letter and spirit of Utah law and will afford Appellant
the opportunity to have his legal rights adjudicated by a
court of law.

Both this court and the

U~ah

Department of

Transportation have said it does.
In a recent case interpreting the right to appeal from
the decision of the Transportation Commission. NATIONAL
ADVERTISING CO. v. UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 26 U. 2d 132,
486 P. Zd 383 (1971), this court found that Rule 81 (d) U.R.C.P.
applied in determining che period in which an appeal can be
taken from a decision of the Transportation Commission.

Rule

Sl(d) provides that:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"These Rules shall apply to the practice
and procedure in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other
action ~fan administrative board or agency,
except 1nsofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal
or review is in conflict with these Rules."
Due to the qualifying language in the last sentence and the fact
that the Legislature amended Section 27-12-136.9 U.C.A. (1953)
which provides the procedure for appeal from the Transportation
Commission, it might be argued that Rule 8l(d) no longer
applies.

This deserves close scrutiny.

Previous to the amendment by the Legislature, Section
27-12-136.9 did not specify any time limit within which a party
would have to appeal.

It now reads as follows:

"The decision of the col1lllission may be
appealed to the District Court in the
county in which the sign is located . .
Appeals shall be taken within 30 days of
the commission's decision by filing a
notice of appeal and sending a copy of the
notice to the commission."
This new language at the end arguably restricts the time
to appeal td a 30-day period commencing with the decision of the
commission.
been late.

If this is so, then Appellant's appeal would have
However, the Transportation Commission itself has

answered this argument in their Rules adopted under the Utah
Administrative Rules Act.

The Utah Transportation Department

Regulations ASS-30-l :l4c dealing with appeals from hearing
decisions contains the following language:
"Notice of appeal from the Commission decision
to the District Court for review shall be in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be sent to the Director of the Utah Department
of Transportation postmarked or filed prior
to the 30th day from the Commission findings,
conclusions and decision, and as rovided in
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81 d).
(Emphasis added.)
Herein the Commission has expressly adopted the holding in
National Advertising and thereby made themselves subject to the
holding of this court relative to the interpretation of those
rules.

The only remaining question is whether or not the

Rules of Civil Procedure dictate a different rule from the 30days from decision interpretation.
In the Brief filed by the Attorney General's Office in
support of their motion to dismiss Appellant's appeal in the
District

Co~rt

it is conceded that where the Rules of Civil

Procedure do apply, that Rule 73(h) is that rule in that it
provides for appeals from lower tribunals to district courts.
Appellant concedes that this is the proper interpretation.
That Rule provides:
"An appeal may be taken to the district court
from a final judgment rendered in a city court
within one month after notice of the entry of
such judgment.
Although the language is clear, this court expressly interpreted
this language in BUCKNER v. MAIN REALTY & INS. CO., 4 U. 2d 124,
288 P. 2d 786 (1955), and found that it required a 30-day
from notice appeal time.

Given the application of this section

to the appeal in question, Appellant's appeal filed 25 days
from receipt of notice was timely. and the district court had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINT I, THIS COURT SHOULD
ANNOUNCE A RULE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
WITH REFERENCE TO APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.
In a dissenting opinion in, MARSH v. UTAH HOMES, INC.,
17 U. 2d 248, 408 P. 2d 906 (1965), Chief Justice Crockett
stated the following:
"One of the purposes of our new Rules of
Civil Procedure was to eliminate rigidities
which had become engrafted into procedure
and to provide some degree of liberality
where that is necessary to effectuate justice."
He further stated that:
"I am both aware of and committed to the
advisability generally of orderli~ess of
procedure by adhering to rules. Nevertheless,
it seems to me that it is often a mistake
to attempt to see all of the law in the strict
and literal application of one single statute,
particularly where it results in depriving a
party of a legal right or an opportunity to
have it adjudicated, whereas, following other
provisions of the law would avoid such an
arbitrary result."
In the case of ADAMSON v. BROCKBANK, 112 U. 52, 185 P. 2d
264 (1947), this court held that the right to appeal is such a
valuable right and that it is presumed to be available.

As such

it would be manifestly unjust for this court to deny Appellant's
right to have his day in court when the path to allow this right
is so clear and will only be lost if this court adopts a strained
and restrictive reading of the relevant language.

A liberal

construction is also required by virtue of Section 68-3-2 U,C.A.
( 1953).
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As mentioned earlier, Rule 73(h) U.R.C.P. provides
for the procedure for appealing to the district courts.

When

compared with Rule 73(a) which deals with appeals to this
court, it becomes clear that a less restrictive rule was
intended.

In Rule 73(a) a strict 30-day from decision rule

is applied, but provision is made for relief from that strict
rule due to excusable neglect.

In recognition of the differ-

ences between appeals from district courts and that from less
structured and formal bodies, namely the lack of dockets and
the predictability of the time when a decision will be reached,
Rule 73(h) adopts a 30-day from notice rule, thereby guaranteeing the losing party at least 30 days in which to perfect his
appeal.

Gh<en the likewise informal procedure before the

Transportation Commission there is certainly no reason to
restrict the right to appeal even more harshly than that from
the District Court by requiring a 30-day from decision rule
and not providing any relief for failure to learn of the
decision.
The facts surrounding the present case and the general
procedure of the Transportation Commission underscore the need
for flexibility and a liberal interpretation.
previously, it was a full

~ine ~onths

As mentioned

from the time the

hearing was held before Commissioner Ward and the decision
of the Commission.

During that time Appellant had no way of

knowing when the decision would be rendered.

According to the
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Commission Secretary, Ronald A. Fernley, the procedure for
adopting a decision is as fol:ows.

The Commissioner who heard

the case drafts a resolution which is considered by the
Commission as a whole and either adopted or rejected.

This

decision is then forwarded to the division which supervises
this area.

This department then prepares the order and

notifies the owner of the signs.

In the present case it took

nearly 14 days from the date of the decision before Appellant
was notified.

Given the complicated procedure outlined, this

was likely very quick action and it is entirely possible that
a given person would never learn of the decision until his
right to appeal had run and if the statute is read restrictively
the right to appeal would have been lost for failure to take
independent steps to learn of the Commission's actions.

Such

action would be extremely difficult, however, since the decisions of the Commission are not published in any newspaper
of general circulation and the Commission itself does not
maintain any docket of its decisions.

In the present case, the

sign owner, who, by the way, was the only person notified,
looked at the date of the letter notifying him of the decision,
September 26, 1977, and mistakenly read the date of the
decision, September 16, 1977, to be one and the same; thereby
leading to the unfortunate and time-consuming process we are
currently engaged in.
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It is certainly apparent that the argument for
greater flexibility applies with great force in the context
of administrative hearings and post-hearing procedure.

We

are not dealing here with a court where the post-trial
procedures are well defined and predictable, but rather with
an area where the Legislature intended that matters be handled
informally, thereby allowing the parties to iron out their
differences without formal motions and rules.
Given the confusion and need for flexibility this
court should hold that Appellant's

appeal was timely and

reinstate it in the District Court.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of the clear application of Rule 73(h) and
the 30-day from notice rule therein announced when coupled
with the inherent need for flexibility in hearing and posthearing procedure when dealing with administrative bodies,
this court should find that an appeal filed 25 days from the
date of notice of the decision of the Utah Transportation
Commission was timely and reinstate this appeal in the
District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN M. HARMSEN
350 South 400 East, 4G-l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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